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1 Introduction
One of the main challenges to building a purely digital currency is that
digital information can be copied, allowing adversaries to duplicate bills or
more generally perform double spending attacks. Existing cryptocurrencies
solve this problem by maintaining a tamper-proof ledger of all transactions
to ensure that the same bill is not spent multiple times by the same actor.
Essentially, in these schemes, money is not represented by a digital token so
much as a number on this decentralized ledger.
Another idea for solving the bill copying problem is to make use of the
quantum no-cloning principle and taking advantage of the idea that quantum
information in general cannot be copied. A scheme to take advantage of this
was proposed by Wiesner in [6]. His scheme involved the bank preparing
a quantum state that was an eigenstate in a secret basis. The bank could
verify the correctness of the state, but it was information-theoretically im-
possible for an adversary without possession of this secret to copy the state
in question. Unfortunately, this scheme has the disadvantage that one needs
to contact the bank in order to verify the legitimacy of a bill.
Since then, there has been an effort to develop schemes for public key
quantum money- that is a scheme by which there is a publicly known pro-
tocol for checking the validity of a bill. In such a system, the bank has a
mechanism for producing valid bills, and there is a publicly known mech-
anism for non-destructively checking the validity of a given bill. It should
be computationally infeasible to produce n + 1 valid bills given access to n
without access to the bank’s secret information. We note that such schemes
can at best be computationally secure rather than information theoretically
secure, as it is a finite computational problem to construct a quantum state
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that reliably passes the publicly known verification procedure. Nonetheless,
there have been several proposals over the years for cryptographically secure
quantum money based on ideas such as knot theory [2] and function obfus-
cation [1, 7]. In this paper, we make a new proposal for public-key quantum
money using ideas from modular forms.
1.1 Our Proposed Scheme
1.1.1 The Black Box Protocol
The verification procedure for quantum money must be non-destructive.
A natural way to achieve this goal is to make the state an eigenstate of
some (commuting collection of) measurement operators. Thus, it is natu-
ral to consider a scheme where there is a set of commuting unitary operators
U1, U2, . . . , Um, and a bill is a joint eigenstate |ψ〉. One can easily verify such a
state and measure the corresponding eigenvalues of the Ui non-destructively.
One can also produce a random such state by starting with some arbitrary
state |ρ〉 and measuring in the eigenbasis of the Ui. In fact one can construct
pairs with the same eigenvalues by starting with a Bell state. However, there
seems to be no obvious way to produce more than these two eigenstates with
the same eigenvalues. This makes this into a scheme for quantum lightning
(see [7]), which by standard methods can be turned into a quantum money
protocol. In particular, to create quantum money, one merely needs the
state |ψ〉 |ψ〉 along with a classical digital signature certifying the sequence
of eigenvalues.
We show (see Theorem 2 below) that this quantum money scheme is
secure if the Ui are implemented as oracles. However, in order to obtain a
practical version of this scheme, one would need to find explicit commuting
operators Ui so that the joint eigenstates are cryptographically complicated.
This is a non-trivial problem, but we have a candidate collection coming from
the action of Hecke operators on spaces of modular forms.
We will discuss the details of the black box version of this protocol and
the related security proofs in Section 2.
1.1.2 Modular Forms
Modular Forms are spaces of highly symmetric analytic functions on the
upper half of the complex plane with a storied mathematical history, finding
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applications in problems as diverse as the computation of partition numbers
to the proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. For our purposes, we note that if
N is a large prime, then the space of weight 2 cusp forms of level N is an
explicit vector space S2(Γ0(N)) of dimension Θ(N) and that for small primes
p the Hecke operators Tp act on S2(Γ0(N)) as a collection of commuting,
self-adjoint operators. This implies that the operators eiTp acting on this
space are a collection of commuting, unitary operators acting on a large,
complex vector space. Furthermore, these operators seem relatively likely to
be cryptographically complicated.
Unfortunately, having an abstract set of commuting operators is not
enough, as we will also need a computationally efficient way to implement
these operators. Fortunately, the action of these Hecke operators on these
spaces of modular forms can be expressed as random walks on certain graphs
on the class group of maximal orders in certain quaternion algebras.
We will give a very brief overview of the theory of modular forms in
Section 3.1. For those interested in a more thorough treatment of the subject,
we will be using [5] as a reference. We will describe some of the relevant
theory of quaternion orders and class groups in Section 3.2 using [4] as a
reference. Finally, we will discuss the details of the computation in Sections
3.3 and 3.4.
2 The Black Box Protocol
We begin by giving a black box version of our quantum money protocol that
relies on having a number of commuting, black box, unitary operations Ui.
In this section we present the protocol along with some black box attacks
against it.
2.1 The Protocol
We begin by assuming that there is some N dimensional vector space V ⊂
(C2)⊗n with a computationally feasible basis (in particular so that we can
construct a maximally entangled state in V ⊗V ). We also assume that there
are commuting unitary operators U1, U2, . . . , Um on V . As they commute,
there exists a joint eigenbasis {|ψi〉}1≤i≤N . Each |ψi〉 has some associated
eigenvalues Uj |ψi〉 = zij |ψi〉 for some unit norm complex numbers zij . We
define the vectors vi = (zi1, zi2, . . . , zim) and assume that the vi are pairwise
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at least ǫ-far from each other. Given an oracle that can compute controlled
versions of the Ui, we present the following quantum money protocol:
A bill in this protocol consists of three things:
1. A note, which is a quantum state of the form |ψi〉 |ψi〉 for some i.
2. A serial number, which is classical information providing a numerical
approximation to vi to error less than ǫ/3.
3. A classical digital signature of the serial number signed by the mint.
In order to validate a bill one merely needs to:
1. Verify the digital signature of the serial number.
2. Use phase estimation to verify that the note is an eigenstate of Ui ⊗ I
and I ⊗ Ui with eigenvalues within ǫ/2 of those given in the serial
number.
Remark. There are a few important things to note about this protocol:
• If the bill was initially properly prepared, the process of verification does
not change it.
• If the note was not an eigenstate of the Ui before this procedure is
applied, it will be after the phase estimation step, and therefore anything
that passes the validation procedure will be a valid bill by the time the
procedure ends.
• Due the assumed separation of the vi, any pair of notes that validate
for the same serial number, must (after validation) have notes corre-
sponding to the same eigenstate.
In order to mint a bill, the bank merely needs to:
1. Prepare a Bell state 1√
N
∑
i |ψi〉 |ψi〉 for V .
2. Use phase estimation on the first component of this state. This will
project the state onto |ψi〉 |ψi〉 for some i and return an approximation
to vi.
3. Use the approximation given above as the serial number, which it then
digitally signs.
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We note that if the serial number is required to be an appropriate unique
rounding of the eigenvalues of |ψi〉 rather than merely an approximation, this
looks very much like a protocol for quantum lightning in the sense of [7]- that
is a mechanism that can produce and label one of a number of states, but
for which it is hard even for an adversarial algorithm to produce multiple
copies of the same such state. We chose to use arbitrary approximations so
that one does not need to worry about precision errors if the true eigenvalues
are near the boundary between two different roundings, however, we should
maintain many of the applications of quantum lightning including quantum
money as well as provable randomness.
2.2 The Security Problem
What might an attack against this scheme look like? For quantum lightning,
an attack would require a method for producing two copies of the same bolt
(in this case pair of identical eigenstates). We argue that any attack on our
quantum money protocol should be able to do this. In fact it is enough to
note that having four copies of the same eigenstate, one can throw away one
to get three copies. Thus, we base our security on the following problem:
Problem 1. Manufacture a state of the form |ψi〉 |ψi〉 |ψi〉 for some 1 ≤ i ≤
N .
We claim that any agent capable of attacking this system, must be capable
of solving Problem 1. In particular, we consider two kinds of attacks on the
system:
1. Attacks by the mint: This would apply for systems where the mint
creates a public registry of valid serial numbers (or perhaps puts them
into a hash tree, publishing only the root). In such a system, the mint
itself might try to cheat by creating multiple copies of bills appearing
in the registry.
2. Attacks by others: an attacker given access to some number of valid
bills and perhaps a much larger number of valid serial number signa-
tures finds some procedure by which to spend more bills than they
initially had access to.
We attempt to argue that if one is able to perform either type of attack
that one can solve the security problem. In particular, we show that:
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Theorem 1. Suppose that an adversary using a quantum computer in time
C can either:
1. Given the secret key to the signing protocol, produce n + 1 valid bills
with at most n total serial numbers among them with probability at least
p.
2. Given n bills and s signatures of serial numbers but without access to the
signing key for the signatures, run a procedure, which with probability
at least p gets third parties to verify at least n+ 1 bills.
Then there is a quantum algorithm that runs in time O((C + s + n)/p) and
with constant probability either:
1. Given a collection of valid signatures from the signature scheme, pro-
duces a new valid signature without access to the private key.
2. Solves Problem 1.
Note the similarity to the security proofs in [1].
Proof. For attacks by the mint the argument is easy. By the pigeonhole prin-
ciple, at least two of the bills produced must have the same serial number.
Given the separation between the vi, this must mean that the notes in ques-
tion are both of the form |ψi〉 |ψi〉 for the same value of i. Using one and
a half of these, they have produced a state of the form |ψi〉 |ψi〉 |ψi〉. Thus,
in time C we can solve Problem 1 with probability p. Repeating 1/p times,
yields a constant probability of success.
The argument for the second kind of attack is slightly more subtle. Sup-
pose that given n valid bills and s additional valid signatures of serial num-
bers, the attacker can spend a total of n + 1 bills. We use this procedure,
along with a black box classical signing algorithm to with probability at
least p either solve Problem 1 or produce a valid signature not returned by
the signing algorithm. Once again, repeating 1/p times, improves this to a
constant probability of error.
To this end, we use the signing algorithm to produce n + s valid bills.
For s of them, we put the notes aside, leaving only the signatures and serial
numbers. The other n are given to the algorithm. The algorithm (which is
not given the private key for the signature scheme), simulates its interaction
with third parties leading to proper verification of n + 1 bills. Note that
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after verification these notes along with the s put aside give us a total of
n + s + 1 notes, each with a valid signature of its serial number. It must
be the case that either we have some valid signature that is not one of the
n + s originally produced by out signing algorithm (thus producing a new
signature without the private key), or, by the pigeonhole principle, at least
two notes corresponding to the same valid signature, in which case we have
solved Problem 1. This completes the proof.
2.3 A
√
N Attack
We note that the obvious O(
√
N) time attack against the security problem:
• Mint √N bills.
• Search for pairs of bills with serial numbers sufficiently close to each
other.
Each bill will yield a state |ψi〉 |ψi〉 for a uniform random value of i, therefore,
by the birthday paradox, we should expect to find a collision within the first
O(
√
N) bills.
2.4 A Black Box Lower Bound
One might worry about black box attacks against this system. That is attacks
making use of no special structure of V or the Ui and merely applying the
Ui in some specified way in order to attack our security problem. Here we
show that any such attack must take at least Ω(N1/3) time.
Theorem 2. Any circuit using standard gates and controlled Ui gates that
solves Problem 1 with constant probability for arbitrary sets of commuting
operators Ui must have Ω(N
1/3) controlled Ui gates.
Proof. Our basic strategy is as follows. We first note that if the eigenspaces of
the Ui were actually degenerate, then Problem 1 would actually be impossible
to solve by a strengthening of triorthogonal uniqueness. In particular, we
show
Claim 1. Let W be a complex vector space. For any |φ〉 ∈ W ⊗W ⊗W , we
have
E
|ψi〉 orthonormal basis of W
[∑
i
| 〈ψi| 〈ψi| 〈ψi| |φ〉 |2
]
≤ 3
dim(W )
.
7
This says that no vector is close to being a diagonal 3-tensor in a random
basis. In particular, if the eigenspaces of the Ui are degenerate, our algorithm
will not be able to determine which basis of the eigenspace in question is the
one given by the |ψi〉, and thus will not be able to produce a state with
large component in any |ψi〉 |ψi〉 |ψi〉 direction. From there we make use of
the polynomial method to show that any black box algorithm of small size
cannot distinguish between the degenerate and non-degenerate cases.
We begin with a proof of Claim 1.
Proof. Let n = dim(W ). It suffices to show that
E
||ψ〉|2=1
[| 〈ψ| 〈ψ| 〈ψ| |φ〉 |2] ≤ 3
n2
.
We rewrite |ψ〉 as 1√
n
∑n
i=1 xi |ψi〉 where |ψi〉 is a random orthonormal basis
for W and xi are i.i.d. ±1 random variables. We claim that even after
fixing the |ψi〉, the expectation over xi is at most 3/n2. In particular let
|φ〉 = ∑1≤i,j,k≤n aijk |ψi〉 |ψj〉 |ψk〉 where ∑1≤i,j,k≤n |aijk|2 = 1. Then the
expectation over xi is
E
xi


∣∣∣∣∣
∑
1≤i≤j≤k≤n
aijkxixjxk
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 /n3.
Collecting like terms this is
1
n3
E
xi
[∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i,j,k=1
(aijk + aikj + ajik + ajki + akij + akji)xixjxk
+
n∑
i=1
xi
(
aiii +
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
aijj + ajij + ajji
)∣∣∣∣∣
2]
.
By orthogonality of the variables xixjxk and xi, this is
1
n3
(
n∑
i,j,k=1
|aijk + aikj + ajik + ajki + akij + akji|2
+
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣aiii +
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
aijj + ajij + ajji
∣∣∣∣∣
2)
.
8
Noting that the later square terms have at most 3n− 2 terms each in them,
by Cauchy-Schwartz this is at most
1
n3

 ∑
1≤i,j,k≤n
i 6=j 6=k
6|aijk|2 + (3n− 2)
n∑
i=1
(
|aiii|2 +
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
|aijj|2 + |ajij|2 + |ajji|2
) .
Collecting terms, this is at most
n∑
i,j,k=1
(3n− 2)|aijk|2/n3 ≤ 3/n2.
This completes the proof.
Our basic approach will be by the polynomial method. Let C be any
circuit consisting of standard gates and at most d controlled Ui gates. We
show that under the correct distributions over Ui, any circuit with d too
small will be unable to distinguish the cases where the eigenspaces of Ui are
degenerate (where the problem is impossible by Claim 1), and those where
it is not.
Let D be any probability distribution over (S1)m. We define a probability
distribution over (U1, . . . , Um) by letting |ψi〉 be a random orthonormal basis
of V (under the Haar measure), and letting the vi be i.i.d. samples from
D. Note that if D is for example the uniform distribution over (S1)m and
m ≫ log(N), then the separation requirement for the vi holds with high
probability. We note that these choices uniquely determine the Ui. We note
that the probability of success of our circuit is
E
|ψi〉,vi
[∑
i
| 〈ψi| 〈ψi| 〈ψi|C(Ui) |0〉 |2
]
.
We note that this is of the form
E
vi
[p(zij , z¯ij)]
for some polynomial p of degree at most 2d.
For integers M , we define a slightly different probability distribution over
the vi. We let h : [N ] → [M ] be a uniform random hash function and let
vi = uh(i) where the uj are i.i.d. elements of D. We let AM be
E
vi
[p(zij , z¯ij)]
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where the vi are distributed according to this distribution.
There are several things worth noting about this distribution.
Firstly, it is easy to see that our original probability of success is limM→∞AM .
This is because for large M , with high probability h has no collisions and
therefore the distribution over the vi is arbitrarily close in total variational
distance to i.i.d. copies of D.
Secondly, we note that AM = q(1/M) for some degree at most 2d polyno-
mial q. This is because for any fixed monomial m(zij , z¯ij) of degree at most
2d we have that
E
ui
[m(zij , z¯ij)]
only depends on the pattern of collisions that h induces on the i’s appearing
in zij that show up in m, and the probability of any such collision pattern is
a degree at most 2d polynomial in 1/M .
Finally, we will need the following Lemma
Lemma 1. If M is less than a sufficiently small multiple of N/ log(N), then
q(1/M) = O(M/N).
Proof. We note that for such values of M that with high probability that
for every j ∈ [M ] that |h−1(j)| = Ω(N/M). We claim that for any such
fixed h, the probability of success of our circuit is O(N/M) regardless of its
size. In fact, this is true even after fixing the values of uj, and the spaces
Vj = span{|ψi〉 : h(i) = j}.
We note that the Vj are eigenspaces for Ui with eigenvalues zij . We note
that the output of C depends only on the Vj and the uj, but not on which
basis of Vj is given by the {|ψi〉 : h(i) = j}. Therefore, the output is some∑
j aj |φj〉 for some |φj〉 ∈ Vj and
∑
j |aj|2 = 1. The probability of success is
then ∑
j
|aj |2 E
|ψi〉

 ∑
i:h(i)=j
| 〈ψi| 〈ψi| 〈ψi| |φj〉 |2

 .
By Claim 1, this is at most∑
j
|aj|2O(1/ dim(Vj)) = O(M/N).
This completes the proof.
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So to summarize, if a circuit exists with only d controlled Ui gates, there
exists a degree at most 2d polynomial q so that
1. q(1/M) = O(M/N) for integers M ≪ N/ log(N).
2. q(0) = Ω(1).
We claim that this implies d = Ω(N1/3).
For this, we proceed by contradiction. Let C be a sufficiently large con-
stant, and assume that N is larger than a sufficiently large multiple of Cd3.
For integers i from 1 to 2d+ 1, let mi =
Cd3
(2i−1)2 and Mi = ⌊mi⌋ . Then Mi is
an integer with
1
Mi
=
(2i− 1)2
Cd3
+O(1/m2i ).
We note that q(1/Mi) = O(Mi/N) for each i, and using polynomial inter-
polation we will attempt to prove that this implies that q(0) is also small.
Using standard polynomial interpolation, we have that
q(0) =
2d+1∑
i=1
q(1/Mi)
∏
j 6=i
1/Mj
1/Mj − 1/Mi .
We begin by bounding these expressions if the Mj were replaced by mj .∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i,j≤2d+1
1/mj
1/mj − 1/mi
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i,j≤2d+1
(2j − 1)2/(Cd3)
(2j − 1)2/(Cd3)− (2i− 1)2/(Cd3)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i,j≤2d+1
(2j − 1)2
(2j − 1)2 − (2i− 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
(2j − 1)2
(2j − 1)2 − (2i− 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where the final product is over all positive integers. This last product is
proportional to (2i− 1)−2/f ′((2i− 1)2) where f(z) =∏∞j=1(1− z/(2j − 1)2).
However, f(z) has exactly the same roots as cos(π
√
z/2). Since both are
order less than 1 holomorphic functions that agree at 0, we have that they
must be equal. Therefore, we have that∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i,j≤2d+1
1/mj
1/mj − 1/mi
∣∣∣∣∣ = O(|π sin(π(2i− 1)/2)/(4(2i− 1)3)|) = O(1/i3).
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Therefore, we have that∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
1/Mj
1/Mj − 1/Mi
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
1/mj +O(1/m
2
j)
1/mj − 1/mi +O(1/m2i + 1/m2j )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
1/mj
1/mj − 1/mi
∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
(
1 +
O(1/m2i + 1/m
2
j)
|1/mi − 1/mj|
)
= O(1/i3) exp
(∑
j 6=i
O
(
i4 + j4
(i2 − j2)Cd3
))
≤ O(1/i3) exp
(∑
j 6=i
O
(
max(i, j)4
(max(i, j)|i− j|Cd3
))
≤ O(1/i3) exp
(∑
j 6=i
O
(
max(i, j)3
|i− j|Cd3
))
.
Now if i ≤ √d, the terms with j ≤ 2i sum to at most O(1/d), and the larger
terms in the sum are O(j2/Cd3), and therefore sum to O(1). If i ≥ √d, then
the terms are O(1/C|i−j|), and thus sum to O(log(d)/C). This implies that
q(0) =
2d+1∑
i=1
q(1/Mi)
∏
j 6=i
1/Mj
1/Mj − 1/Mi
=
√
d∑
i=1
O(Mi/Ni
3) +
2d+1∑
i=
√
d
O(log(d)Mi/ni
3)
=
√
d∑
i=1
O(Cd3/Ni5) +
2d+1∑
i=
√
d
O(Cd3 log(d)/ni5)
= O(Cd3/N),
which is o(1) if N is a sufficiently large multiple of Cd3.
We note that this bound is nearly tight. In particular, if we assume sep-
aration of the vi, there is actually an algorithm for solving Problem 1 with
constant probability in O(N1/3m/ǫ) queries. The algorithm involves comput-
ing N1/3 pairs |ψi〉 |ψi〉, then preparing N2/3 many other Bell states. These
Bell states can be thought of as being in a superposition of all combinations
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of N2/3 pairs tensored together. There is a reasonably probability that one
of these N2/3 pairs agrees with one of our N1/3 pairs, and we can find the
index of such a pair using Grover’s algorithm by measuring the eigenvalues
of only O(N1/3) of our Bell pairs. In order to compute the eigenvalues to
sufficient accuracy takes only O(m/ǫ) queries each. Thus, this algorithm has
query complexity O(N1/3), although the full complexity is N2/3.
3 Implementation Using Modular Forms
In the last section, we discussed a quantum money protocol that depending
on having access to a number of black box, commuting operators. However,
for our protocol to be cryptographically secure, we will need to implement
it using operators that are cryptographically difficult to work with. This is
a bit of an issue as most easily computable sets of commuting operators will
not be secure in this way. For example, taking Ui = Zi gives an easy set of
commuting operators, but ones for which it is easy to manufacture eigenstates
(even ones with specified eigenvalues). We come up with a hopefully secure
set of commuting operators using the theory of modular forms, presented
using computations involving class groups of quaternion algebras. In the
next two subsections, we review the existing theory on these topics.
3.1 Modular Forms
Here we provide a very brief overview of the theory of modular forms that
will be relevant to our discussion. For a more detailed explanation, see [5].
Let H = {z ∈ C : ℑ(z) > 0} denote the upper half of the complex plane.
For positive integers N , let Γ0(N) denote the group of two by two matrices
Γ0(N) :=
{(
a b
c d
)
: a, b, c, d ∈ Z, ad− bc = 1, c ≡ 0 (mod N)
}
.
This is a slight abuse of notation as this N will not quite agree with the
N used in the previous section, though should be consistent up to constant
multiples. A weakly modular function of weight 2 and level N is an analytic
function f on H so that for every
(
a b
c d
)
∈ Γ0(N) we have that
f(z) = (cz + d)−2f
(
az + b
cz + d
)
.
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Such a function is called a cusp form if for q any rational number or i∞,
limz→q f(z) = 0. We let S2(Γ0(N)) denote the space of cusp forms of weight
2 and level N . We note the well known fact that dim(S2(Γ0(N))) = ⌊N/12⌋.
Note that for such functions f(z) = f(z+1). Therefore f can be written
as a power series in q = e2piiz. Since f vanishes at i∞, we can write it as
f(q) =
∑∞
n=1 anq
n.
For primes p relatively prime to N we have the Hecke operator Tp acting
on S2(Γ0(N)) as (Tpf)(z) = pf(pz)+
1
p
∑p−1
a=0 f
(
z+a
p
)
. Equivalently, if f(q) =∑
anq
n, Tpf(q) =
∑
panq
pn +
∑
anpq
p.
The eiTp will form our (hopefully cryptographically complicated) set of
commuting operators on a vector space. However, in order for this to be
useful, we will need a way to compute with them. In the coming sections we
discuss a method for computing (approximately) operators that are isomor-
phic to the eiTp. First we will need to introduce some facts about quaternion
algebras.
3.2 Quaternion Algebras
Before we discuss our implementation in detail, we will need to review some
basic facts about orders in quaternion algebras for which [4] can be used as
a reference. We will at times assume that N ≡ 3 (mod 4), as this will allow
us to make several parts of the computation more explicit, although this is
not necessary in general.
Let H := {a+ bi+ cj + dk : a, b, c, d ∈ R} be the Hamilton quaternions, a
non-commutative ring whose multiplication is given by the relations i2 = j2 =
k2 = ijk = −1. Define the conjugate of an element by (a+ bi+ cj + dk) =
a−bi−cj−dj. Then for an element z = a+bi+cj+dk, we define Tr(z) = a =
(z+z¯)/2 and Nm(z) = a2+b2+c2+d2 = zz¯. Note that Nm defines a positive
definite quadratic form on H. For prime N let HN := Q[i,
√
Nj,
√
Nk] be
the unique quaternion algebra over Q ramified only at N and infinity. Let
ON be a maximal order in HN . In particular, for N ≡ 3 (mod 4), we may
take ON = Z[i, (1 +
√
Nj)/2, (i+
√
Nk)/2].
A (left) fractional ideal of ON is a full-rank lattice in HN that is closed
under left multiplication by elements of ON . We define the set of ideal classes
Cl(ON ) to be the set of fractional ideals of ON modulo right multiplication
by elements of HN (i.e. we define I ∼ J if there’s some z ∈ HN so that
I = Jz).
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Let p be a prime not equal to N . Let [I], [J ] ∈ Cl(ON) be ideal classes.
Define ap([I], [J ]) to be the number of J
′ ∼ J so that J ′ ⊂ I and so that
I/J ∼= Z/p × Z/p. We note that in such a case, pI ⊂ J with J/pI also
isomorphic to Z/p× Z/p, and thus ap([I], [J ]) = ap([J ], [I]).
Finally, let VN be the subset of C
Cl(ON ) where the sum of the coefficients
is equal to 0. Let Mp be the matrix acting on C
Cl(ON ) with [I], [J ]-entry
ap([J ], [I]).
Fact 1. The Mp preserve VN and act as self-adjoint operators on it. Further-
more, the system of operators Mp acting on VN is isomorphic to the system
of operators Tp acting on S2(Γ0(N)).
3.3 Computation of Mp
In order to use these operators in our quantum money scheme, we will need
to find a way to make these operators computationally tractable. Firstly, we
will need to find a better way of representing our ideal classes. While it is easy
to give a single fractional ideal in the class, it is important for us that we find
a canonical representation. To do this we first note that given a class I we
can represent it’s class by the fractional ideal Iz−1 for z a non-zero element
of minimal norm in I. We note that this representation does not depend on
our original ideal I in the class, though it may depend on a choice of one of
finitely many elements of minimal norm in I. The fractional ideal Iz−1 can
then be represented by providing a reduced basis for the corresponding lattice
in HN . We note that this provides a canonical representation of an element of
Cl(ON ) up to the choice of finitely many possible choices of minimal element
z and finitely many possible reduced bases of Iz−1. Of these possibilities, we
take the lexicographically first representation to present the element [I].
Next, for an ideal class [I] given in this format, we will need to find the
multiset of ideal classes [J ] with non-zero ap([I], [J ])-entries. This is relatively
straightforward as we need to find I ⊃ J ⊃ pI that are invariant under left
multiplication of ON , or equivalently we need to find J/pI ⊂ I/pI that are
invariant under ON/p. However, it is a standard fact that the action of
ON/p on I/pI will always be isomorphic to the action of M2(Z/p) on itself.
Once these isomorphisms are computed, the invariant elements of I/pI will
correspond to {A ∈ M2(Z/p) : Av = 0} for v some non-zero element in
(Z/p)2. Since these sets will be invariant under scaling of v, there will be
exactly p+1 such Js that should be computable in a straightforward manner.
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Furthermore, since we are given a reduced basis of I and since J is a small
index sublattice of I, it will be relatively simple to compute a reduce basis
for J and thus, the appropriate canonical representation for [J ].
This allows us to compute the non-zero entries of a row of Mp (which
is manifestly self-adjoint). Thus, using standard Hamiltonian simulation
algorithms, it is straightforward to approximate the action of eiMp on VN .
3.4 Producing Bell States
There is one additional difficulty in implementing our scheme in this context.
It is that there is no obvious way to produce a Bell state for VN . In this
section, we provide an efficient algorithm for doing this.
In order to produce this representation, we first note that it suffices to
produce a state which is a uniform superposition of the representatives for
the elements of Cl(ON ). In order to do this, we begin by providing a different
representation of such elements.
In particular, we associated before a class [I] to a fractional ideal Iz−1
where z was an element of minimal norm in I. Let m be the minimal pos-
itive integer so that mIz−1 ⊂ ON . We could as easily represent [I] by the
fractional ideal mIz−1 (we note that it is easy to compute this map in either
direction). Next, we note that mON ⊂ mIz−1 ⊂ ON .
In order to describe mIz−1 we consider mIz−1/mON ⊂ ON/m, which is
invariant under left multiplication by ON/m. We note again that ON/m is
isomorphic to M2(Z/m) (as it must be the case that m and N are relatively
prime). Picking such an isomorphism, mIz−1 corresponds to an ideal in
M2(Z/m). It is easy to see that mIz
−1 does not contain m′ON for m′ > 1
nor is it contained in m′ON for 0 < m′ < m. This implies that mIz−1 must
correspond to some ideal of the form {A : Av = 0} where v = (a, b) ∈ (Z/m)2
with gcd(a, b,m) = 1. In other words, mIz−1 is specified by a positive integer
m and an element v ∈ P1(Z/m). More particularly, this corresponds to a
triple of positive integers m, d, a (where the element of P1 is [d : a]) satisfying
d|m, a ≤ m/d and gcd(a, d) = 1. Equivalently, writing b = m/d, this
corresponds to a triple d, a, b with gcd(a, d) = 1 and a ≤ b.
Unfortunately, this representation is not 1−1. In particular, some triples
a, b, d will correspond to a fractional ideal mON ⊂ I ⊂ ON so that I/m does
not give the canonical representative of its ideal class (this would happen for
example if m was not the smallest norm element of I). Fortunately, we can
detect when this is the case.
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In order to proceed, we will first need to bound the size of m that we may
need to deal with. Assuming that our ideal class contains an ideal I with
discriminant D, we note that the minimal norm element, z, will have norm
O(D1/4). Therefore, Iz−1 will have discriminant Ω(1). Since the sublattice
ON has discriminant N , this means that [ON : Iz−1] = O(N). However,
ON/Iz−1 ∼= (Z/m)2, and this implies that m = O(
√
N).
We now proceed in the following stages:
1. Let C be a sufficiently large constant.
2. Produce a state proportional to
∑∞
d=1
1
d
|d〉 .
3. Use this to manufacture the uniform distribution over |d, a, b〉 over
triples of positive integers d, a, b with da, db ≤ C√N . This can be
approximated by sending |d〉 to
|d〉 ⊗
(
1√
Md
Md∑
i=1
|i〉
)⊗2
where Md = ⌊C
√
N/d⌋.
4. Reject if a > b or gcd(a, d) > 1.
5. Reject if the ideal defined by the triple (a, b, d) is not in canonical form.
We claim that this procedure has a constant probability of passing the re-
jection sampling. In particular, we note that in step 3, we have a uniform
mixture over
∑∞
d=1O(N/d
2) = O(N) states. The number of these states that
survive the rejection sampling is the number of distinct ideal classes, which
is approximately N/12. Therefore, the probability of survive the rejection
sampling is (N/12)/O(N) = Ω(1).
This allows us to produce the uniform distribution over representatives of
our ideal class group. By adding coordinatewise to a zero ancilla, we produce
a Bell state for CCl(ON ). By throwing away copies of the uniform distribution
over classes, we produce a Bell state for VN . Using this, we can implement
the quantum money scheme described in Section 2.
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4 Attacks
As the operators Ui are no longer black box, one must worry now about
additional attacks against our system. We note here some of the most obvious
and reasons why they might not be expected to work.
4.1 Use of Other Up
An attacker will have access not just to the Ui used by the algorithm but
also to eiTp for any (reasonably sized) prime p. However, our black box lower
bounds should apply even if m is very large (or even infinite), and so this
will not invalidate our lower bounds.
4.2 Other Powers of eiTp
An attacker will be able to apply fractional powers of the Ui, however, it is
not difficult to see that our black box lower bounds can be generalized to
this case.
4.3 Sparse Logarithms
The log(Ui) used in our protocol are sparse operators. One might potentially
take advantage of this. A potential worry is that one might use an HHL-like
algorithm to find eigenvalues (one cannot use HHL directly as the matrix
used would not be invertible). However, HHL only accesses the operator in
question via Hamiltonian simulation, and thus would also be covered by our
black box lower bounds. It is not clear how else an attack might make use
of this.
4.4 Quantum State Restoration
A technique in [3] was developed to break a number of quantum money
schemes that look superficially like ours. These schemes use eigenstates of
some operator H where the state itself has some clean (but secret) product
representation. They show in [3] that if one is given a state |ψ〉 = |ψA〉 ⊗
|ψB〉 ∈ VA ⊗ VB and can compute a measurement of whether we are in state
|ψ〉, we can produce a duplicate of the state |ψB〉 in time poly(dim(VB)). If
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the supposedly secure state is a tensor product of many small pieces, this
can be used to recover the individual pieces one at a time.
However, we have no reason to believe that the eigenstates involved in
our algorithm can be decomposed as such tensor products, so this class of
attacks seems unlikely to work. In fact, it is unclear if there is even any
natural way to write VN as a tensor product.
4.5 Direct Manufacture of Eigenstates
Finally, one might attempt to reconstruct a basis state |ψi〉 from the eigen-
values vi. This seems to correspond roughly to the classical problem of given
approximations to the low degree coefficients of an eigenform in S2(Γ0(N)), to
approximate the coefficients of its representation in VN . The correspondence
between these two representations is known to send the ideal class [I] to the
function
∑
z∈I,z 6=0 q
[I:ONz]. So the low degree coefficients of the form, might
tell useful information about the coefficients of some of the ideal classes with
relatively small elements, but it seems like it would be hard to get anything
approaching the full representation is less than poly(N) time.
5 Conclusion
We have presented what seems like it should be a fairly efficient quantum
money protocol. As far as we can tell, there are no subexponential attacks
on this protocol, and so it should be possible implement securely with only
a few hundred qbits.
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